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Executive Summary 
Despite China’s attractiveness to foreign investors, intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection in China has not caught up with the international standards. This research aims to 
quantify the relationship between IPR violations, government effectiveness, and their impact 
on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in the context of China. Our econometric 
modeling and estimation based on provincial level data over 2002-2012 show that in an early 
development stage of law and regulatory enforcement, the bad news of a rising number of 
IPR dispute cases signals the good news of an improvement in law and regulatory 
enforcement, which encourages IPR owners to raise legal cases. By contrast, in the later 
development stage when law and regulatory enforcement has become much more effective, 
the bad news of a rising number of IPR disputes manifest itself as real bad news. Furthermore, 
this study confirms that the government effectiveness is one of the key factors promoting 
FDIs.  
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1. Introduction 
 
China has experienced rapid economic development and growth since the initiation of market 
reform in 1978 and has emerged as a key player in global trade and financial market. China 
became the world’s largest exporter of goods in 2009 and overtook the US as the world 
number one trading nation in 2013, with a trade volume over US$4 trillion (WTO, 2014). 
According to the latest International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures (IMF, 2014), China also 
surpassed the US as the world’s largest economy in 2014 in terms of GDP based on 
purchasing power parity (PPP). In 2014, China’s PPP-adjusted GDP reached US$17.63 
trillion or 16.48 % of the world’s total, compared with the corresponding US figures of 
US$17.4 trillion or 16.28 % of the world’s total. Such rapid economic development has made 
China the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment since 2002. In 2014, China 
attracted US$ 128 billion of FDI (UNCTAD, 2015).  Despite China’s increased role in the 
global economy and attractiveness to foreign investors, it has been widely acknowledge that 
the level of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in China has not caught up with the 
international standards. This disparity between the China’s emerged economic power at the 
global level and its weak enforcement mechanisms for IPR laws at the national level has 
made IPR protection in China be one of the top concerns in the global business community. 
According to the latest figures, 72%, 77%, and 87% of the total counterfeiting and infringing 
goods seized at  the US, EU, and Japan customs, respectively, came from China in 2012 (US 
IPR Seizure Statistics 2012, Commission, 2013; Japan Customs, 2013).   
 This great concern by the global business community has stimulated an emerging 
body of literature dealing with the issue of weak IPR protection in China and the implications 
for multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the disciplines of law (e.g., Kassner, 2012; Chow, 
2010; Rezler, 2010; Sepetys and Cox, 2009; Gabriel, 2008) and business management and 
4 
 
economics (e.g., Zimmerman and Chaudhry, 2009; Chapa and LeMaster, 2007; Yu, 2007; 
Hung, 2003). Surprisingly, however, there has been a lack of formal econometric work in the 
literature to quantify the relationship between IPR violations, government effectiveness, and 
their impact on FDI inflows in the context of China-specific institutional environment. In 
light of the growing significance of China in the global economy, it is of both academic and 
policy importance to investigate the interactive relationship between IPR infringement 
incidence and the government effectiveness and further to explore how and to what extent 
IPR infringement disputes and government effectiveness affect business activities of foreign 
firms in China.  
 This research aims to fill this important niche. Drawing on insights from a broad 
theoretical literature, this paper develops two econometric models. The first one suggests a 
non-linear relationship between the observed relative level of infringement claim cases and 
the level of government effectiveness, where the observed count of infringement cases equals 
the total number of infringement incidences times the probability of filing a claim with the 
regulatory authorities. The second model suggests that the attractiveness of a host region for 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) is closely associated with the effectiveness of IPR law and 
regulatory enforcement and the government effectiveness of the regional authority. MNEs 
prefer to make their investments in host regions with more transparent and effective 
institutional framework.  A quadratic specification is adopted to test these two models. The 
dataset for the testing include the number of patent infringement claim cases under 
administrative investigation in 30 provinces (including 4 provincial-level municipalities) of 
China during 2002-2012, and the government effectiveness index in 30 Chinese provinces 
constructed by the World Bank in 2006. The Hausman-Taylor estimator is employed to run 
the econometric estimations because this estimator allows for the time-invariant regressors 
(c.f. Government effectiveness) to be correlated with the unobserved individual effects. The 
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estimation results are in line with our expectation. The first set of results confirms an 
inverted-U shaped curvilinear effects running from government effectiveness to the relative 
level of the number of infringement claim cases. The second set of results show that 
government effectiveness has a direct impact on FDI inflows, indicating that a host region 
with a better government effectiveness attract more FDI inflows; furthermore, the relative 
level of the count of infringement claim cases have a positive impact on FDI inflows. The 
results are robust to a number of popular control variables.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional 
foundation of IPR regimes in China. In section 3, based on analytical discussions on IPR 
protection, government effectiveness and FDI, we develop two models to characterize the 
relationship between the number of infringement claim cases and index of government 
effectiveness, and between FDI inflows, the relative level of the number of infringement 
claim cases and the index of government effectiveness. In Section 4, we define the key 
variables and suggest the best available estimation method – the Hausman-Taylor estimator. 
In Section 5, we estimate the models using the Hausman-Taylor estimator and report the 
empirical results. Finally, Section 6 discusses the theoretical and policy implications of the 
findings and presents concluding remarks.  
 
2. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection in China 
 
2.1 China as a key source of counterfeit goods to the world market 
The recent surge in exports of counterfeits worldwide and in particular, those from China to 
other countries, has caused many world leading MNCs to declare intellectual property rights 
(IPR) infringements to be an urgent global business problem (Economist, 2010). It is virtually 
6 
 
impossible to accurately estimate the value of infringing goods originating from China, but it 
is evident that infringing production in China has grown alongside the remarkable growth in 
the Chinese economy and export (Chow, 2010, Zimmerman and Chaudhry, 2009;). In 2012, 
the US, EU and Japan reported a total of 139,928 seizures of shipments of counterfeit and 
infringing goods by their customs authorities, which represents more than a five-fold increase 
from the 24,621 cases in 2003.1 
 China is generally acknowledged as the world’s number one source of counterfeit and 
infringing goods in recent years. For example, the total value of infringing goods seized at the 
US ports of entry was $ 1.26 billion in 2012. Of this total, more than $ 900 million, or 72% of 
the total, originated from China (US IPR Seizure Statistics 2012). In the same year, infringing 
products from China accounted for 77 % and 87 % of the total amount seized by the customs 
authorities of the European Union and Japan respectively (European Commission, 2013; 
Japan Customs,  2013).2  
 
2.2 A wide gap between formulation of IPR regimes and its enforcement 
In recent year, it is observed that IPR laws in China have been increasingly converging with 
international standards (Kassner, 2012; Sepetys and Cox, 2009; Gabriel, 2008; Yu, 2007). 
China joined several international organizations and agreements, and promulgated domestic 
                                                          
1 Authors’ calculation, based on U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of International Trade, 2004, 2013; 
European Commission, 2013; Japan Customs, 2008, 2013. 
2 Based on the assumption that most of the counterfeit and infringing goods exported from Hong Kong were 
actually produced in China (Chow, 2010), the total value of seized counterfeit and infringing goods exported 
from China and Hong Kong to the U.S., EU and Japan totalled $ 1.1 billion, € 862.9 million, and ￥18.4 billion 
in 2012, which accounted for 84 %, 87 % and 94 % of all seizures respectively (Authors’ calculation, based on 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of International Trade, 2013 on slides 10-11; European  
Commission, 2013: p.7 and p.18; Japan Customs, 2013, IMPORT 9 in p.8 ). 
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legislation, including the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China in 1982 and the 
Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China in 1984. In 2001, China joined the WTO and 
since then further amended its IPR laws and regulations comply with the WTO agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Rezler, 2010; Chapa and 
LeMaster, 2007). In spite of continuous development of China’s intellectual property law 
following the international standards, the enforcement of intellectual property laws in China 
has not consistently met international expectations (Kassner, 2012; Yu, 2007). A wide gap 
between the formulation of IPR regimes and its enforcement in China has been observed and 
widely acknowledged. The persistence of the gap is regarded as being rooted in a 
combination of (i) regional disparity in economic development (Yu, 2007), and (ii) 
federalism-Chinese style, which is characterized as decentralized, multi-layer, multi-regional 
governance structure with relatively much harder budget constraints for lower level local 
governments, and inter-jurisdictional competition (Weingast, Qian, and Montinola, 1995; 
Cao, Qian, and Weingast, 1999). Regional disparity in economic development implies 
diverse interests among provincial and municipal governments with respect to enforcement of 
IPR laws. For some local governments, intellectual property infringement is in fact beneficial 
to their local economies because it can create new jobs and tax revenues (at least) in the short 
term (Chow, 2010; Tao, 2007). With local protectionism under the China-specific 
decentralized governance structure, some local governments with relative low levels of 
economic development prioritize the protection of local interest before that of national 
interest of complying China’s IPR regimes with the international standards. Therefore, these 
local governments are likely reluctant to impose strict enforcement measures against alleged 
infringement cases (Chow, 2010; Gabriel, 2008; Tao, 2007; Cox and Sepetys, 2005; Wang, 
2004).  
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3. Theoretical Background and Model Development 
3.1 Influence of government effectiveness on patent infringement claims in China 
Following the logic of gradualist reform, China has adopted a dual track system of IPR 
enforcement (Kassner, 2012; Cox and Sepetys, 2005; Wang, 2004). The first track is the 
judicial enforcement process, which involves filing a complaint to a judicial civil court. The 
second track is the administrative enforcement process, which is regarded as one of the 
distinctive features of China’s IPR protection regime. On the administrative track, the 
administrative agencies investigate infringement cases and penalize the guilty party. Due to 
the legacies of the China’s centrally planned economy system, the administrative proceedings 
have been played the arguably most important role in IPR enforcement (Kassner, 2012). 
Therefore, the number of administrative infringement claim cases under investigation in a 
province can be regarded as an informative indicator of the extent to which the province 
commits to combat IPR infringements.  Table 1 reports the spatial distribution of patent 
infringement claimed through the administrative track by three provincial groups for 2002-
2012. From 2002 to 2012, the number of patent disputes handled by local IP administrative 
authorities totalled 14,451 cases. In terms of geographical distribution, more than 70% of 
patent infringement was claimed in the coastal region in 2002. While the coastal region 
retained its dominant position in infringement claims, its share in the national total decreased 
by 21.64 percentage points from 72.34% in 2002 to 50.70% in 2011. The central region took 
18.72 percentage points of the share from the coastal region. The west basically kept the 
same growth pace with that of the national total, swinging between 11.15% and 17.89%. The 
coefficient of variations (CV) across the three regions shows a decline trend and decreased by 
about 50% from 2002 to 2012, implying a tendency of reduced disparity.  
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--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
In modeling the influence of government effectiveness on IPR enforcement, the most relevant 
and available data in China is the number of patent infringement cases claimed, claim count. 
It can be decomposed into 
 of Claim ) Count (TICringement  Total Infnt Claims Cou Pr     (1) 
This decomposition captures two distinct aspects of patent infringement cases. TIC can be 
considered as the “supply side” of the infringement claims as it defines the maximum 
possible number of infringement claims.  The level of the supply side activity would be 
affected by the usual business environments such as the market size, the expected benefits of 
those business activities which are based on patent piracy, and the potential punishment if 
being caught by government’s enforcement agencies. It would be natural to expect TIC to be 
negatively correlated with the law and regulatory enforcement as tighter enforcement will 
increase the probability of being caught, getting unfavorable ruling, and paying damage 
compensation.  In other words,   
  1Z11 wLETIC ,              (2)
 3 
with 01  . In Eq. (2), LE means the effectiveness of law and regulatory enforcement and Z1 
denotes the vector of other factors that affect the level of piracy activities.   
Please note that not all patent infringement cases are brought to the attention of 
regulatory bodies. Some cases are simply not caught on radar of patent holders. Even if 
patent holders know the existence of solid infringement cases, however, they may not want to 
                                                          
3 This model can be interpreted as a first order approximation of a more general model, ),( 1ZLEfTIC  . 
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bring such cases to the government or the court because the costs of legal actions may exceed 
the expected benefits. Generally speaking, under a weaker enforcement system, a case is less 
likely to be accepted and then ruled favorably to the patent holders. This will lead to a lower 
probability of filing claims. In recognizing this, we posit that the “demand side” of piracy 
claims is positively correlated with the law and regulatory enforcement and thus,  
  2Z22  Pr wLE of Claim ,        (3) 
where Z2 denotes the vector of other variables affecting the probability of filing claim, and 
we expect 02  .    
  Given that Claims Count is the product of TIC and probability of claims and the two 
multiplying factors have opposite correlation signs with respect to LE, we do not know which 
effect would dominate a priori. Therefore, we allow for non-linearity in our operational 
model for econometric estimation as follows: 
  Z3
2
21 αLELEtClaim Coun ,      (4) 
in which Z incorporate control variables of both Eqs. (2) and (3). 
 
3.2 Influence of government effectiveness on activities of foreign funded enterprises in 
China 
Since the seminal work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998), a 
growing body of research in political economy and finance has suggested legal origin, 
whether a country follows common laws or civic laws, has persistent impacts on various 
dimensions of legal institutions, which in turn leads to systematic difference in economic 
performance. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) argues that common law countries tend to have 
better investor protection, measured by quality of legal rules and law enforcement than civil 
law countries, and thus are more likely to house broader equity and debt markets. Djankov et 
11 
 
al. (2007) shows that a country with better creditor protection is more likely to have 
developed private credit market.  Djankov et al. (2008) demonstrate that stronger debt 
enforcement is positively correlated with GDP per capita and debt market development. 
These studies find evidence that effective legal rules and law enforcement are conducive to 
protection of outside investors’ rights, which in turn promotes external financing.  
 In the international business literature, recent empirical evidence has shown that 
effective institutional environment in a host country is an important determinant of foreign 
direct investment inflows (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Seyoum, 2009; Mengistua and 
Adhikary, 2011; Hsu and Tiao, 2015). Using international data on FDI inflows and outflows, 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) find that good governance affects the security of property 
rights, transparency of government and legal processes and thus attract more FDI inflows. 
Also, using a probit model with data on outward FDI from the United States, Globerman and 
Shapiro (2003) argue that good institutions in host countries establish a conducive climate to 
the multinational companies from the USA. By examining the effects of the World Bank’s 
notion of good governance on FDI inflows in 15 Asian countries, Mengistua and Adhikary 
(2011) find that political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, rule of 
law, and control of corruption are the key determinants of FDI inflows. These findings 
highlight the importance of improving domestic governance environment for attracting FDI 
inflows, which is also confirmed by Seyoum (2009), finding that strong formal institutions in 
host countries attract more FDI flows. Hsu and Tiao (2015) investigate the relationship 
between patent rights protection and inward FDI in eleven Asian countries and their 
empirical results indicate that the strengthening of patent rights protection has a positive 
impact on inward FDI in Asian countries.  
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 In line with the above discussion, we specify the following model to quantify the 
impact of IPR protection level and government effectiveness measurement on the business 
activities of foreign funded enterprises in China.  
   Z3βLECountClaimActivityFFE 21        (5) 
where FFE Activity is the level of foreign funded enterprises’ business activities and Z is the 
vector of control variables as we defined before.  One may argue that a larger number of 
claims may signal weak IRP protection, which in turn deters foreign firm’s activities. If it is 
true, we would expect 1 < 0.  However, our discussion in this and previous subsections has 
implied that the effect of claim counts on FFE activities may differ owing to the regional 
heterogeneity in IPR protection. For example, in a more developed region with stronger IPR 
protection, it is plausible that the demand for (or probability of filing) claims is already high. 
In such a regulatory environment, an increase in claim counts can be interpreted as an 
increase in IPR infringement, thus representing a negative signal to potential foreign 
entrepreneurs. By contrast, in a less developed region with a weak IPR protection regime, the 
total infringement incidents might be already very high. An increase in claim counts here can 
indicate that the existing IPR entrepreneurs are keener to raise claims upon infringement. 
This signals that they believe the enforcement of law and regulations in the region is more 
trustworthy than before, and thus representing good news for potential foreign investors in 
the region. To test this idea, we adopt the following specification: 
   Z4321 )(*) (   βLECoastCountClaimCountClaimActivityFFE  (5’) 
where Coast represents a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for the observations 
from the coastal region and zero otherwise.4 In general, the coastal (non-coastal) areas have 
                                                          
4 The coastal regions include Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, 
Guangdong, and Hainan. 
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better (worse) enforcement of law and regulations. 5  Thus, we expect 1 > 0 and 2 < 0.   
With regard to LE, in line with the standard argument in the literature as reviewed above, we 
expect that the more effective legal system and government is associated with more active 
foreign investment, and thus, the coefficient on the LE is expected to be positive. 
 
4. Data, Variables, and Estimation Methods 
4.1 Dependent Variables  
The dependent variable for Eq. (4) is the relative level of patent infringement cases 
claimed in region i and year t ( itClaim ), which is measured as the ratio of patent infringement 
cases claimed in region i and year t to the national total number of patent infringement cases 
claimed in year t, and is presented in percentage. To measure business activity of MNEs in 
China which is the dependent variable in Eq. (5), we use the logarithm of the number of 
foreign funded enterprises in region i and year t ( itnumberFFE ,ln ). Data used in our 
estimations is a panel of 30 provinces and municipalities over the period 2002-2012. Among 
all 31 provinces and municipalities in China, Tibet is excluded mainly because of data 
unavailability. The number of patent infringement cases claimed at the provincial level is 
obtained from Patent Statistical Yearbook published by the State Intellectual Property Office 
of China (SIPO, www.gov.cn). The data source for foreign funded enterprises in China is 
obtained from China Statistical Yearbook (various years) published by the State Bureau of 
Statistics in China.  
 
                                                          
5. We use coastal vs. non-coastal classification to sort the regions according to the maturity of law and 
regulatory enforcement. In unreported robustness tests, we have also performed regressions similar to (5’) using 
different dummy variables such as high vs. low government effectiveness, etc. Our qualitative results are robust 
to these alternative specifications. 
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4.2 Independent Variables  
The variable representing the effectiveness of law and regulatory enforcement (LE) in Eq (4) 
is the government effectiveness index in the region i and year t ( itEffect ), which is measured 
as the average of city-level government effectiveness index across cities in province i and 
year t (t = 2006). The information on local government effectiveness in China is obtained 
from World Bank (2006). It was based on a large survey of 120 cities and 12,400 firms 
conducted in 2006 and has been the most comprehensive survey on government effectiveness 
in China so far. Since the unit of analysis we adopt in this study is province, we aggregate 
and organize the survey data into 30 provinces (Table 2). Following the specification of Eq. 
(4), we take both itEffect   and its square to capture the possible non-linear effect of the 
effectiveness of law and regulatory enforcement (LE2) on relative level of patent infringement 
claims. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.3 Control Variables  
Although we suggest the importance of the law and regulatory enforcement in determining 
the level of patent infringement and business activities of MNEs, a number of other factors 
have been identified in the literature as important determinants of piracy activity levels and 
FDI. To take into account the effects of those factors, we incorporate a comprehensive set of 
control variables in our empirical estimations (Z in Eqs. (4) - (5’)). First, we employ the 
measures and proxies involving regional market size, regional output of knowledge 
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production, and regional openness level. In addition, we also include yearly and regional 
fixed effects to address unobserved time and regional specific characteristics.    
Regional market size is measured by the logarithm of gross regional product in the 
region i and year t and denoted as itGRPln . Regional output of knowledge production is 
defined as the relative level of patent applications in the region i and year t ( itPatent ), which 
is measured as the ratio of patent application number in the region i and year t to the national 
total number of patent applications in year t, and is presented in percentage. The degree of 
openness ( itOpen  ) is proxied by the ratio of the total amount of trade (the sum of total export 
and import value by place of destination or origin) in region i and year t to the gross regional 
product in region i and year t and is presented in percentage. Data sources for constructing all 
above control variables are China Statistical Year Book (various years).  
Table 3 presents the summary statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables 
employed in our empirical regressions. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.4 Econometric Model and Estimation Methods   
To test the existence of the non-linear relationship between the relative level of patent 
infringement claims and government effectiveness with the above-discussed robustness 
control, we reformulate eq. (4) as follows: 
   ittiit
ittiiiit
uOpen
PatentGRPEffectEffectClaim




5
43
2
2006,22006,10
            
ln 
        (6)
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where iu  and t  capture region- and year-specific effects, respectively, and it is an error 
term. 
 We also reformulate eq (5) and (5’) to test relationship between MNEs’ business 
activities, relative level of patent infringement claims and government effectiveness with the 
same set of robustness control: 
 ittiit
ittiiititnumber
uOpen
PatentGRPEffectClaimFFE




5
432006,210,
            
ln 
            (7) 
           ittiitit
tiiitititnumber
uOpenPatent
GRPEffectCoastClaimClaimFFE




65
42006,3210,
                   
ln* 
  (7’)
 
Panel data method is used to control unobserved individual effects in the data. To 
choose fixed or random effects, the Hausman test is conducted and it reveals that the 
unobserved individual effects are correlated with the regressors. Therefore, the fixed effects 
estimator is the preferred model. However, one of the main disadvantages of the fixed effects 
estimator is that it wipes out the effects of time-invariant regrossors (e.g., 2006,iEffect ). Using 
Monte Carlo experiments, Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte (2003) shows that the random effects 
model leads to misleading inference if some regressors are correlated with the individual 
effects. We use the Hausman-Taylor model (1981) to address this issue. By using the 
individual means of exogenous regressors as instruments for the time invariant regressors, the 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator recaptures the estimates of time-invariant regressors 
under a model where some of the regressors are correlated with the individual effects. In our 
empirical exercises, however, we report both random effect and Hausman-Taylor estimations 
for Eq. (6) and both fixed effect and Hausman-Taylor estimations for Eqs. (7) and (7’) to 
show the advantage of Hausman-Taylor methods and also the robustness of our key results 
with respect to estimator choice. 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Impact of government effectiveness on patent infringement claims in China 
Eq. (6) is estimated by the random effects and Hausman-Taylor estimators, respectively. The 
estimation results are presented in Table 4. Let us first look at the results of columns 1 and 3, 
which focus on the linear effect of 2006,iEffect  only.  The coefficient estimations of 
2006,iEffect produced by random effects and Hausman-Taylor estimators are statistically 
insignificant and this suggests that the non-linear effects of government effectiveness on 
claim counts may have cancelled out in the linear setting. Columns 2 and 4 investigate the 
non-linear effect hypothesis using random-effect and Hausman-Talyor methods. The results 
support an inverted U-shaped relationship between government effectiveness and the relative 
level of infringement claims. For instance, the coefficients of 2006,iEffect ( 1ˆ  0.387) and 
2
2006,iEffect ( 2ˆ 0.003) support an inverted U-shaped relationship between law 
enforcement effectiveness and the relative level of infringement claims. This result suggests 
that in the early development stage of law and regulatory enforcement, the marginal effect of 
tighter enforcement on the probability of encouraging patent owners to raise cases 
(  of ClaimPr  in Eq. (1)) is greater than that on reducing the violations of patent rights (TIC 
in Eq. (1)), as a result, tighter enforcement is associated with a higher level of infringement 
claims. It is in this sense we say that such bad news as a higher level of infringement claims 
is good news for foreign investors because it signals an improvement in law and regulatory 
enforcement in the region. By contrast, in the latter development stage when the effectiveness 
of law and regulatory enforcement has reached a high level, the marginal effect of tighter 
enforcement on reducing TIC is greater than that on  of ClaimPr  and thus tighter 
enforcement will lead to reduced number of violation cases.  
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 With regard to control variables, their coefficients all are positive and statistically 
significant in Eq. (6). This implies that a region with a larger regional market size ( itGRPln ), 
a greater regional output of knowledge production ( itPatent ), and a greater degree of 
openness ( itOpen ) is likely to experience a relatively higher level of infringement claim cases.  
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
5.2 Impact of government effectiveness on activities of foreign funded enterprises in 
China 
Eqs. (7) and (7’) are estimated by fixed effects and Hausman-Taylor estimators. The 
estimation results are presented in Table 5.  Models 1-3 in Table 5 test the impacts of claim 
cases ( itClaim ) and government effectiveness ( 2006,iEffect ) separately. Model 1 examines the 
role of the claim variable without the coastal region dummy and using the fixed effect 
approach. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on claims count is statistically insignificant. As 
hinted in section 3.2, it is possible that the signs of the coefficient on claim cases are different 
across regional zones with different effective level of law and regulatory enforcement. In the 
presence of such disparity, the average effect could become insignificantly. Model 2 
addresses this concern with the help of the coastal area dummy. In Model 2, the coefficient of 
itClaim variable is significantly positive and the coefficient of CoastClaimit  is negative 
(with a p value = 0.105). Consistent with our expectation in Section 3.2, these results indicate 
that a higher level of claims count number in the coastal provinces is associated with a lower 
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level of FDI activities and the opposite relationship holds in the inland regions. This contrast 
suggests that an increase in claim counts in different types of regions sends different signals 
to potential foreign investors. In inland provinces where the base-number of total 
infringement case has been already relatively high, more claim-counts would mean a higher 
probability of filing claims, which reflects the incumbents’ confidence that the law and 
regulatory enforcement in the region is improving. This is good news to foreign investors. On 
the contrary, the coastal regions have a relatively much more effective enforcement system, 
which would lead to a higher probability of filing claims. Thus, an increase in claim counts in 
coastal regions can be a result of increasing infringement activities and this comes as bad 
news. In Model 3, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of 2006,iEffect   indicates 
that the number of foreign funded firms is positively related to the level of regional 
government effectiveness, consistent with the literature.  
Models 4 and 5 assess the effect of both itClaim and 2006,iEffect   jointly. Consistent 
with the results from Model 1, the coefficient of itClaim is insignificant when regional 
disparity (coastal vs inland regions) is not accounted for. The coefficient of 2006,iEffect  in 
Model 4 is significantly positive but the magnitude of the marginal effect is weaker than that 
of Model 3 (0.005 vs. 0.021). Nevertheless, when we take into account regional disparity in 
the effects of itClaim by including an interaction term ( CoastClaimit  ), the coefficients of 
both itClaim  (  0.020) and CoastClaimit  (  -0.024) become statistically significant 
even if the quality of government effectiveness and other influential factors are controlled for. 
Again, these results support our expectation in Section 3.2. The coefficients of 2006,iEffect  in 
Models3-5 are consistently positive and statistically significant as conventionally expected.  
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 Turning to control variables, their coefficients are positive and statistically significant 
across all models in Table 5, except the coefficient of itPatent  which is statistically 
insignificant in all 5 models.   
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
6. Discussions and Conclusions 
Despite an emerging body of literature on the issue of weak and uneven IPR protection in 
China, there has been a lack of econometric research to quantitatively assess the relationship 
between IPR violations and government effectiveness and further their impact on FDI inflows 
in the context of China. This study has addressed this challenge and thus filling an important 
niche in the literature. 
 This study takes into consideration infringement disputes, government effectiveness 
and inward FDI in the context of China’s institutional environment and develops two models. 
The first model addresses the non-linear relationship between the relative level of 
infringement claim cases and the effectiveness level of law and regulatory enforcement 
across provinces in China. The second model characterises the important role played by 
government effectiveness and law enforcement in attracting foreign investors. The empirical 
estimation of the second model also reveals that regional disparity in the effectiveness of law 
and regulatory enforcement lead to different signalling effect of IPR infringement claim cases 
to foreign investors.  
  Because one of the key independent variables, government effectiveness 
( 2006,iEffect ) is time-invariant and some of the independent variables are correlated with the 
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individual effects, we employ the Hausman-Taylor method to estimate our panel-data models 
and to detect the non-linear relationship between the relative level of infringement claim 
cases and the effectiveness level of law and regulatory  enforcement across provinces in 
China. Using the number of patent infringement claim cases under administrative 
investigation in 30 provinces of China during 2002-2012 and the government effectiveness 
index in 30 Chinese provinces constructed by the World Bank in 2006, the estimation results 
support the specifications of our two models and are consistent with our analytical 
expectation. The results show that the relationship between government effectiveness and the 
relative level of infringement claim cases is non-linear and exhibits an inverted-U shaped 
effects. This result suggests that in an early development stage of law and regulatory 
enforcement, the bad news of a rising number of IPR dispute cases signals the good news of 
an obvious improvement in the effectiveness of law and regulatory enforcement which 
encourages patent owners to raise legal cases. By contrast, in the later development stage  
when law and regulatory enforcement has become relatively much more effective, the bad 
news of a rising number of IPR dispute cases does manifest itself as real bad news. In 
addition, this study confirms that the government effectiveness is one of the key factors 
promoting FDI activities. 
 Our finding offers an interesting policy implication. Suppose that policy makers in 
developing country/region consider implementing more stringent IPR enforcement to attract 
more foreign investment. It is highly likely that such an implementation will lead to an initial 
increase in IPR claims counts, which may become news headlines. Our findings suggest that 
the policy makers should not worry about such media attention and continue to focus on 
improving the effectiveness of law and regulatory enforcement, because intelligent investors 
will read such headlines as good news and become more willing to invest in the 
country/region. 
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 In addition to the revealing of the above insight, this study also contributes to the 
international business literature by quantitatively modelling the effects of government 
effectiveness on the IPR infringement claim numbers and FDI inflows.  Our modelling 
framework and the associated empirical testing methods are clearly applicable to similar data 
from other countries. Future research in this direction would be able to check the extent to 
which the findings of this research can be generalized. 
 Two limitations of this study are worth mentioning. First, the government 
effectiveness index (World Bank, 2006) this study has adopted is only available for one year. 
Although this index is the most comprehensive and reliable so far and the issue of time-
invariance variable in regression model can be addressed by Hausman-Taylor estimator, it 
might not be able to capture the effect of government effectiveness over time. Future research 
could examine this issue when updated government effectiveness index becomes available 
across provinces and also over time. Second, the number of infringement claim cases this 
study has used is based on patent infringement only and do not cover other sources of 
infringement such as counterfeiting goods, trademark, copyrights etc. Future research should 
work with various sources of infringement.  
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Table 1.  Patent infringement cases claimed and closed in China 
Panel A. Regional distribution of patent infringement cases claimed 
Year 
Coast Central West China Coefficient of 
variation among 
coast, central and 
west regions 
Cases (%) Cases (%) Cases (%) Cases (%) 
2002 1,012 (72.34) 231 (16.51) 156 (11.15) 1,399 (100) 1.02 
2003 926 (63.95) 303 (20.93) 219 (15.12) 1,448 (100) 0.80 
2004 919 (64.99) 315 (22.28) 180 (12.73) 1,414 (100) 0.83 
2005 870 (63.97) 313 (23.01) 177 (13.01) 1,360 (100) 0.81 
2006 780 (63.57) 265 (21.60) 182 (14.83) 1,227 (100) 0.79 
2007 635 (64.40) 199 (20.18) 152 (15.42) 986 (100) 0.81 
2008 686 (62.82) 279 (25.55) 127 (11.63) 1,092 (100) 0.79 
2009 573 (61.15) 211 (22.52) 153 (16.33) 937 (100) 0.73 
2010 547 (50.79) 359 (33.33) 171 (15.88) 1,077 (100) 0.52 
2011 652 (50.70) 453 (35.23) 181 (14.07) 1,286 (100) 0.55 
2012 1,313 (59.01) 514 (23.10) 398 (17.89) 2,225 (100) 0.67 
Note: Coast Region includes Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, Fujian, Zhejiang, Liaoning, Beijing, 
Tianjin, Hebei, Hainan; Central Region includes Guangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Henan, Anhui, Heilongjiang, 
Jilin, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia; West Region includes Chongqing, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Yunnan, Gansu, Guizhou, 
Qinghai, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Tibet. 
Source: Calculated by authors based on Patent Statistical Yearbook, 2002-2013. 
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Table 2. Cities surveyed and average of government effectiveness index at provincial level 
   
Province/ 
municipality 
City Average of government 
effectiveness index at 
provincial level 
Beijing (1) Beijing 52.00 
Tianjin (2) Tianjin 60.50 
Hebei (8) 
Baoding, Cangzhou, Handan, Langfang, Qinhuangdao, 
Shijiazhuang, Tangshan, Zhangjikou 59.25 
Shanxi (3) Datong, Taiyuan, Yunchang 98.50 
Inner Mongolia (2) Baotou, Huhehaote 87.50 
Liaoning (6) Anshan, Benxi, Dalian, Fushun, Jinzhou, Shenyang 75.58 
Jilin (2) Changchun, Jilin 94.00 
Heilongjiang (3) Daqing, Haerbing, Qiqihaer 100.67 
Shanghai (1) Shanghai 51.50 
Jiangsu (9) 
Changzhou, Lianyungang, Nanjing, Nantong, Suzhou, 
Wuxi, Xuzhou, Yancheng, Yangzhou 47.50 
Zhejiang (8) 
Hangzhou, Huzhou, Jiaxing, Jinhua, Ningbo, Shaoxing, 
Taizhou, , Wenzhou 31.19 
Anhui (4) Anqing, Chuzhou, Hefei, Wuhu 63.00 
Fujian (5) Fuzhou, Quanzhou, Sanming, Xiamen, Zhangzhou 39.10 
Jiangxi (5) Ganzhou, Jiujiang, Nanchang, Shangrao, Yichun 56.40 
Shandong (9) 
Jinan, Jining, Linyi, Qingdao, Taian, Weifang, Weihai, 
Yantai, Zibo 20.94 
Henan (7) 
Luoyang, Nanyang, Shangqiu, Xinxiang, Xuchang, 
Zhengzhou, Zhoukou 62.36 
Hubei (7) 
Huanggang, Jingmen, Jingzhou, Wuhan, Xiangfan, 
Xiaogan, Yichang 77.36 
Hunan (6) 
Changde, Changsha, Chenzhou, Hengyang, Yueyang, 
Zhuzhou 100.00 
Guangdong (9) 
Dongguan, Foshan, Guangzhou, Huizhou, Jiangmen, 
Maoming, Shantou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai 21.17 
Guangxi (3) Guilin, Liuzhou, Nanning 85.83 
Hainan (1) Haikou 86.50 
Chongqing (1) Chongqing 57.00 
Sichuan (5) Chengdu, Deyang, Leshan, Mianyang, Yibin 65.00 
Guizhou (2) Guiyang, Zunyi 97.50 
Yunnan (3) Kunming, Qujing, Yuxi 76.17 
Shaanxi (3) Baoji, Xian, Xianyang 61.67 
Gansu (2) Lanzhou, Tianshui 101.00 
Qinghai (1) Xining 102.00 
Ningxia (2) Wuzhong, Yinchuan 64.75 
Xinjiang (1) Wulumuqi 77.00 
Source. Calculated by authors based on World Bank (2006); A smaller index value indicates higher level of 
government effectiveness.  
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Table 3.  Descriptive statistics and correlation matrixa,b  
 
           
 
          
  Mean S.D. Min. Max. (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) 
 
          
 
          
(1) itClaim  3.331 4.763 0 29.664 1.000     
  
         
(2) itEffect  
69.098 23.245 20.944 102 -0.610 1.000    
  
         
(3)
itGRPln  
8.785 1.016 5.797 10.952 0.515 -0.533 1.000   
  
         
(4)
itPatentln  
3.333 4.541 0.045 25.067 0.718 -0.669 0.582 1.000  
  
         
(5) itOpen  
34.312 42.913 3.572 174.968 0.412 -0.569 0.353 0.677 1.000 
 
          
 
           
a N = 330.  
b All correlation coefficients are significant at p  0.001. 
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Table 4. Estimation results: Effects of Governance effectiveness on infringement claims  
     
 Random effects Random effects Hausman-Taylor Hausman-Taylor 
          
Independent Variables     
 
    
2006,iEffect         0.037 [0.028]  0.448*** [0.103]         -0.004 [0.039]  0.387*** [0.163] 
 
    
2
2006,iEffect   -0.003*** [0.001]  -0.003*** [0.001] 
 
    
Control Variables     
 
    
itGRPln    1.580** [0.680]   1.244** [0.602]     3.284*** [1.170]   2.265** [1.126] 
     
itPatent  0.204*** [0.069] 0.177*** [0.068]       0.155** [0.070]   0.146** [0.070] 
     
itOpen    0.024** [0.010]   0.018** [0.009]     0.030*** [0.011] 0.026*** [0.010] 
     
Constant     -8.053 [6.605]       7.264 [6.770] -24.413** [11.192]   -5.647 [11.950] 
     
Wald Chi2 62.38*** 95.48*** 50.49*** 65.06*** 
     
R2 0.485 0.635   
     
† N = 330.  
†† Significance levels: * p  0.10, ** p  0.05, *** p  0.01. 
††† Numbers in [ ] are standardized errors.
30 
 
 
Table 5. Estimation results: Effects of government effectiveness on FDI 
      
 
Model 1 
(Fixed effects) 
Model 2 
(Fixed effects) 
Model 3 
(Hausman-Taylor) 
Model 4 
(Hausman-Taylor) 
Model 5 
(Hausman-Taylor) 
            
Independent Variables      
 
     
itClaim      0.004 [0.007]     0.020* [0.012]             0.004 [0.007]    0.020* [0.012] 
 
     
CoastClaimit        -0.024
# [0.015]     -0.024* [0.014] 
      
2006,iEffect     0.021*** [0.005] 0.005*** [0.007] 0.023*** [0.005] 
 
     
Control Variables      
 
     
       itGRPln  0.477*** [0.031]  0.470*** [0.032]  0.485*** [0.032] 0.484*** [0.032] 0.478*** [0.032] 
      
       itPatent      -0.008 [0.008]      -0.007 [0.008]      -0.005 [0.008]     -0.006 [0.008]      -0.004 [0.008] 
      
       itOpen  0.009*** [0.001]  0.010*** [0.001] 0.010*** [0.001] 0.010*** [0.001] 0.010*** [0.001] 
      
Constant 3.886*** [0.275]     3.933* [0.276] 5.333*** [0.477] 5.315*** [0.479] 5.429*** [0.487] 
      
F-statistics/Wald Chi2 97.93*** 91.62*** 1365.85*** 1362.39*** 1317.371*** 
      
R2 0.836 0.823    
      
† N = 330.  
†† Significance levels: # = 0.105, * p  0.10, ** p  0.05, *** p  0.01. 
††† Numbers in [ ] are standardized errors. 
 
